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Abstract
We motivate and provide an overview to New Monetarist Economics. We
then brie￿ y describe the individual contributions to the Macroeconomics Dy-
namics special issues on money, credit and liquidity.
1 Introduction
This two-volume special issue of Macroeconomic Dynamics contains a collection of
papers on money, credit, liquidity, banking, payments, asset pricing, and related top-
ics. The contributions not only share general substantive interests, but also utilize a
common method that we obviously endorse. This method involves an e⁄ort to take
seriously the microeconomic foundations of models used to study the topics under
consideration. It is clear to us that not all practitioners adopt this approach and that
much work in macroeconomics is not su¢ ciently concerned with the microeconomic
details behind institutions such as money, credit, or intermediation.1 In many pop-
ular models, money is introduced by using some ad hoc short cut, say by putting
1Appeals for better microfoundations in monetary economics go back a long time. Examples
include Hicks (1935) and some of the papers, including the introduction, in the volume of Kareken
and Wallace (1980). See also Wallace (1998,2001,in press) for updated discussions of these issues.
The general approach we are advocating here has been dubbed New Monetarist Economics in two
papers by Williamson and Wright (2010,in press), which discuss methodological issues, and survey
the literature, respectively. An extended textbook treatment of the framework with a wide variety
of applications can be found in Nosal and Rocheteau (in press). Although we are obliged to say a
1real balances into utility or production functions, or by imposing a cash-in-advance
constraint. Indeed, sometimes other assets, including government bonds or commer-
cial bank reserves, are also inserted into utility or production functions. Moreover,
in many of the models that dominate contemporary discussions of monetary policy
at central banks, there is no money at all, and nothing that resembles intermediation
in any interesting way.2
The reason many economists either ignore institutions like money, or slip them
in with short cuts, is this: they do not take seriously the nature of the process of
exchange. Following classical general equilibrium theory, agents do not trade with
each other, but trade only against their budget constraints. Any bundle that is
worth no more than the value of one￿ s endowment is available, with no discussion of
how it is to be acquired. Everyone worth his salt understands that there is no role
in Debreu￿ s frictionless paradigm for money, intermediation, or anything else that
facilitates the process of exchange since this process is not part of model.3 Unless
one introduces explicit frictions, therefore, short cuts are needed to get money and
related institutions into the discussion. These short cuts are meant to stand in for
a more detailed description of the role of institutions in facilitating exchange. Two
possible explanations for such implicit theorizing are: 1) the modelers do not care
about making their assumptions explicit; and 2) they cannot ￿gure out how to do it.
We understand that the problem may seem hard, and if one cannot ￿gure out
how to model things explicitly, one is reduced to reduced-form reasoning. It is harder
to understand the position that we do not (or should not) care about modeling the
process of exchange explicitly. How could one say it does not matter until one does
it? Some have argued that modeling the details of exchange and intermediation is
nothing more than studying the ￿plumbing￿of the economy ￿it all works well behind
the scenes and so we do not need to pay attention to it. This seems wrong. How do
we know it is working well if we do not pay attention to it? What happens if the
￿plumbing￿goes bad? We know what this entails, and it is not pretty. We believe
few words on these matters in this Introduction, we refer readers to those sources for much more
detail concerning why we think this approach is useful, and how it can be put to work, so that we
can get on with describing the individual contributions in this collection.
2The authoritative reference for the popular New Keynesian approach where money plays no
role ￿the model by design is cashless ￿is of course Woodford (2003). An earlier survey of New
Keynesian models is contained in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). Williamson and Wright (2010,in
press) provide more references, including examples models that put money, bonds, or bank reserves
in utility or production functions. Among those we think more of as microeconomists, including for
instance Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), or Holmstrom and Triole (2010),
we respect the spirit of these recent e⁄orts to discuss liquidity and related issues, but at the end of
the day their theories look a bit too much like cash-in-advance models for our taste. We would like
to be able to elaborate on this , but do not have space to do justice to the issues here. Instead of
critiquing alternatives, we prefer in this special issue to suggest the approach we advocate is useful
and prove the point by providing examples of interesting papers.
3Certainly Debreu (1959) understood this: ￿[An] important and di¢ cult question ... not answered
by the approach taken here: the integration of money in the theory of value￿
2that it is dangerous to ignore the details of ￿plumbing￿and that the recent ￿nancial
crisis makes this obvious. We therefore think that it is important to study institutions
that help to facilitate exchange, and the papers in this special issue do just that.
We have grouped the contributions together by the themes of money, credit and
liquidity. Why? One of the simplest institutions is of course money, which is used
as a medium of exchange to overcome the double-coincidence problem and situations
where credit is di¢ cult to use.4 But work in the area has gone well beyond studying
how currency ameliorates frictions in trade. The study of credit and banking arrange-
ments is another important area where there has been recent progress.5 In general,
a characteristic of the methods we are advocating is a focus on liquidity. Liquidity
is discussed in other branches of economics and ￿nance, of course, but we think the
approach adopted by the papers in this collection is especially fruitful. In particular,
some of the most interesting work on ￿nancial markets and asset pricing is very much
consistent with methods developed in the microfoundations of monetary economics
literature.6
All of this work is based on the fundamental principle that exchange needs to
be modeled explicitly. This involves building models with detailed descriptions of
the process of trade. More importantly, it means incorporating frictions that make
exchange less than perfect, so that there is an essential role for institutions that
help facilitate the process. Such frictions include limited commitment, imperfect
information or record keeping, and so on. This is what the literature has been up to
for the last two decades. The objective of the current special issue is to illustrate by
way of example some of what people are doing in frontier research along these lines.
The papers in this collection take various di⁄erent, but de￿nitely related, approaches
4Early examples of work in this literature studying the role of commodity or ￿at money as a
medium of exchange include Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,1991) and Ayigari and Wallace (1991).
Much of the modern research in the area uses the more recent models in Shi (1997) or Lagos and
Wright (2005). In between, there was much work extending the basic framework, including e.g. Shi
(1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), and clarifying exactly what frictions are required to make a
medium of exchange essential, including e.g. Kocherlakota (1998a,b) and Wallace (2001). Again, see
Nosal and Rocheteau (in press) for a summary. Much of this research is pure theory, but recently
there has been much more quantitative work, including as recent examples Aruoba, Waller and
Wright (2009) and Aruoba and Shorfheide (in press).
5A position advocated in Williamson (1987) is that what makes ￿nancial intermediation poten-
tially worth studying are its special functions, such as diversi￿cation, information processing, and
asset transformation. We cannot expect to generate these special activities or derive many useful im-
plications if our approach does not build on the economic features that cause ￿nancial intermediaries
to arise in the ￿rst place. This is another call for making ones assumptions explicit and generating
market structure, including intermediation, endogenously. Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007)
and Williamson (2009) provide recent example that show how to put these ideas into practice in
New Monetarist models. Sanches and Williamson (2010) is an example of more detailed analysis of
credit and its interaction with monetary exchange. Nosal and Rocheteau (in press) provide many
other applications in the study of credit and payments systems.
6We have in mind e.g., papers by Du¢ e, G￿rleanu and Pederson (2005,2008), Lagos (2008), Lagos
and Rocheteau (2009), or Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2010).
3to the substantive issues at hand. They all try to incorporate details of the exchange
process in hope of enhancing our understanding of the way it works. By way of
preview, we now summary the individual contributions.
2 The Papers
￿Coin Sizes and Payments in Commodity Money Systems￿by Angela Redish and
Warren Weber is an example of applying the framework to issues in monetary history
(they reference other such applications). They argue that several features of medieval
and early modern European commodity monetary systems are hard to capture using
models of centralized exchange. For example, physical characteristics of commodity
money, such as coin size, created shortages of small change, which had real e⁄ects
on trade. To confront these issues, they construct a random matching model with
indivisible coins with di⁄erent intrinsic values. The paper shows that small change
shortages can exist in the sense that welfare increases when small coins are added
to a large coin economy. Further, they study the real implications of changes in the
denomination structure and in the quantity of metals in commodity money. They
show that replacing full-bodied small coins with tokens may not improve welfare. It
would be di¢ cult to examine these sorts of issues and generate the interesting eco-
nomic results that they obtain using reduced-form models with, say, cash-in-advance
constraints.7
In ￿Banking, Liquidity and In￿ ation,￿Jonathan Chiu and Cesaire Meh develop a
search-based model to study the interaction between banking and monetary policy,
extending earlier work by Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). They argue that
understanding the nature of intermediation is critical for assessing the cost of in￿ ation.
They ￿nd that, when banking is explicitly in the model, in￿ ation generates smaller
welfare costs, compared to a no-banking environment, due to avoiding costs associated
with intermediation. In equilibrium, monetary policy a⁄ects the a⁄ects welfare in
rather interesting ways. When in￿ ation is low, banking is not active, and when
it is high, banking is active and improves welfare by channeling liquidity to those
who need it most. At moderate levels of in￿ ation, welfare is actually reduced by
banking activity. But, owing to general equilibrium feedback, banking can be active
in equilibrium at moderate in￿ ation levels, even though welfare is higher without it.
This is a nice example of how being careful with the details of the exchange process
makes a big di⁄erence for understanding intermediation.
In ￿On the Threat of Counterfeiting,￿Yiting Li and Guillaume Rocheteau study
counterfeiting issues. In contrast to earlier work by Nosal and Wallace (2007), Li
and Rocheteau show that a monetary equilibrium always exists, irrespective of the
7There have been attempts, including the interesting work of Sargent and Velde (2002), but we
think the cash-in-advance approach is simply not as natural or as rich. See Wallace (2003) for a
more detailed critique of Sargent and Velde￿ s approach
4technology for producing and the technology for identifying counterfeits. Neverthe-
less, the possibility of counterfeiting ￿at money a⁄ects its value, as well as velocity,
output and welfare, even if no counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium in their benchmark
model. Policies that make currency more costly to counterfeit, or easier to recognize,
will raise the value of money and welfare, but may not always decrease counterfeit-
ing. We think this is a nice contribution to recent research that studies the role of
recognizability in determining which objects are used in payments and at what prices.
Private information about asset quality is important and interesting in theory and in
practice, and this kind of analysis helps us understand how to analyze models where
this is made explicit.
In a related paper, ￿Money, Markets and Dynamic Credit,￿Amy Sun provides
a theory of money and credit. Financial intermediation is studied when both the
intermediary and individuals have private information. Money is essential because it
helps solve a dynamic two-sided incentive problem. Requiring settlement with ￿at
money induces market trades that generate information-revealing prices that better
discipline the intermediary. If ￿nancial intermediaries can issue private money ￿
money that records its own history of being used in settlements ￿then it is optimal
to have only private money circulate in the economy. This kind of analysis greatly
enhances our understanding of intermediation, payments and settlement.
￿Liquidity Provision in Capacity Constrained Markets,￿by Pierre-Oliver Weill,
follows up on some of his previous work, Weill (2008). He analyzes a dynamic ￿nan-
cial market, where market makers face a capacity constraint on trading with outside
investors, and the ￿nancial market is subject to a transient selling pressure. Market
makers manage their capacity constraint over time and, as a result, liquidity to the
market. When selling pressure is strong, they use slack capacity early to accumulate
assets, so as to relax their capacity constraint and sell to buyers more quickly when
the selling pressure subsides. When the capacity constraint binds, the bid-ask spread
is strictly positive and depends on the change in inventories. A key insight is that
variations in bid-ask spread are not a symptom of ine¢ cient liquidity provision, since
the equilibrium asset allocation is constrained Pareto optimal. This is another inter-
esting contribution to the study of ￿nance that incorporates explicit frictions into the
theory.
￿Monetary Policy Implementation Frameworks: A Comparative Analysis￿by An-
toine Martin and Cyril Monnet presents two stylized frameworks for the implementa-
tion of monetary policy that resemble what we actually observe in practice. The ￿rst
framework has only standing facilities, while the second implements monetary policy
through open market operations. Although the Friedman rule cannot be implemented
when the central bank uses standing facilities only, for a given rate of in￿ ation that
can be achieved by both frameworks, standing facilities unambiguously deliver higher
welfare than open market operations. Their results suggest that any monetary pol-
icy implementation framework should remunerate both required and excess reserves.
This is an example of recent work in this literature that tries to model the details of
5policy implementation explicitly.8
The next two papers revisit an old idea in monetary economics, the ￿ Hot Potato￿
e⁄ect of in￿ ation (people spend their money faster when in￿ ation goes up). While
this intuition has been around for a long time, formally modeling it is more challeng-
ing than one thinks. In the paper by Lucy Liu, Liang Wang and Randall Wright, it is
argued that monetary theory with endogenous search intensity seems ideal for study-
ing this issue, but in standard models, since in￿ ation is a tax that lowers the surplus
from monetary exchange, it actually reduces search e⁄ort and therefore the speed at
which people spend their money. The authors therefore replace search intensity with
a free entry (participation) decision for buyers, and focus on the extensive rather than
intensive margin. They show that in this model buyers always spend their money
faster when in￿ ation increases. In his related paper, Ed Nosal focuses on intensive
margin e⁄ects to show that an increase in in￿ ation causes people to speed up their
spending. In the model, buyers must exit the market after making a trade and have
to wait in a queue to re-enter the market. When waiting is costly, buyers are very
choosy in terms of their purchases ￿even though a match can generate surplus, a
buyer may forego the trade if the surplus is small. An increase in in￿ ation makes
buyers less choosy.
These two papers are interesting from the point of view of this collection for
the following reason. Many times those of us who work on microfoundations hear
the following question: What can one do with a search model that one could not
do with a reduced-form model that assumes money enters the utility function or
imposes cash in advance constraints? This is a subtle issue. We have learned over the
years that the key frictions making a medium of exchange essential are more about
limited commitment and information than about spatial or temporal separation per
se, even though search theory provides us with natural environments within which we
can easily incorporate the relevant commitment and information frictions. For many
questions, search may be useful but it is not strictly necessary. For the questions in
these papers ￿does in￿ ation make people spend their money faster, and what are
the implications for the e⁄ects of monetary policy on velocity, output and welfare?
￿search is of the essence. By de￿nition, search theory is the way to endogenize the
time it takes to trade.9
The papers on the ￿ Hot Potato￿e⁄ect show that how one models the search process
can make a big di⁄erence for the predictions of theory. It is also known that it mat-
ters how one models the determination of the terms of trade in both theoretical and
quantitative applications. In ￿In￿ ation and Unemployment in Competitive Search
Equilibrium,￿Mei Dong provides another illustration of this important message. In
earlier work, Rocheteau, Rupert, and Wright (2007) show that the relationship be-
tween in￿ ation and unemployment (i.e. the long run Phillips curve) can be positive or
8See also Berentsen and Monnet (2008) and Berentsen and Waller (in press).
9Earlier work using search theory to study the impact of in￿ ation on the time it takes to spend
ones money, velocity, and welfare includes Li (1995), Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), and Ennis (2008).
6negative, depending on preferences, in models where both unemployment and mon-
etary exchange are modeled with explicit microfoundations. However, they assumed
random search and used bargaining for price determination, and were only able to
prove their results under the extreme assumption of buyers making take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄ers. Dong instead uses directed search and price posting, and is able to prove the
same results, plus interesting extensions, more generally. Again, it is clear from all
of this work how details of the process by which agents meet and the mechanism by
which they choose the terms of trade make a big di⁄erence for monetary theory and
policy. We see nothing like this message having emerged from the cash-in-advance or
money-in-utility-function literature. We see less in the New Keynesian literature.
Moving right along, a paper that emphasizes both the process by which agents
meet and the nature of private information is ￿Adverse Selection, Segmented Markets
and the Role of Monetary Policy￿by Steve Williamson and Daniel Sanchez. In their
model, trading partners are asymmetrically informed about future trading opportu-
nities, and spatial and informational frictions limit arbitrage between markets. These
frictions create ine¢ ciencies, the extent of which is a⁄ected by monetary policy. A
Friedman rule is optimal under a wide range of circumstances, including ones where
segmented markets limit the extent of monetary policy intervention. These kinds of
models teach us much about the way exchange works in decentralized environments
and this can have important policy implications.
In ￿Random Matching and Money in the Neoclassical Growth Model: Some Ana-
lytical Results,￿Christopher Waller adds long-run technical change to the monetary
version of the neoclassical growth model used by Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2009)
to study the impact of in￿ ation on capital accumulation. In the prevailing literature,
using a reduced-form approach, the exchange process is not modeled and so we can-
not be sure the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on anything, including growth, are being captured
appropriately. Waller tries to shed light on this issue by incorporating matching fric-
tions and bargaining into neoclassical growth theory. A key result is that in￿ ation
lowers per capita income in steady state, as well as the growth rate of the economy
along the transition path. Although the Friedman rule is optimal, it does not give the
￿rst best outcome under bargaining due to a holdup problem. This paper is another
step in the research program trying to reduce the gap between mainstream macro
and models that take seriously the microfoundations of exchange.
The ￿nal paper, ￿The Welfare Cost of In￿ ation in OECD Countries￿by Paola
Boel and Gabriele Camera, is more quantitative in nature. It is known that the
cost of anticipated in￿ ation in seach-and-bargaining models when calibrated to the
US economy can be an order of magnitude higher than in traditional reduced-form
models.10 Boel and Camera measure the cost of in￿ ation in a microfounded model of
money calibrated to each of twenty-three OECD countries for several sample periods.
10Thus, in Lucas (2000) or Cooley and Hansen (1989) one ￿nds that eliminating a 10% in￿ ation
is worth roughly 1/2 of 1% of consumption, while in Lagos and Wright (2005) the same policy can
be worth 10 times as much.
7With pricing taking, they predict that agents in most of the countries would give
up less than 1% of consumption to eliminate 10% in￿ ation. When one assumes
bargaining, however, agents are willing to give up as much as 6% to eliminate 10%
in￿ ation in some countries. The results presented here further our knowledge of
the quantitative properties of the models in monetary theory. This, of course, an
important ongoing part of the ongoing research agenda.
In summary, ￿rst, we think that tremendous progress has been made over the
last two decades on New Monetarist models. Also, we believe that the papers in this
special issue, individually and collectively, advance our understanding of how money,
credit and liquidity a⁄ect the exchange process and this is relevant both in terms of
theory and policy analysis. But while our understanding of the roles of money, credit,
intermediation and related institutions has improved greatly, there is much more to
be done. The recent ￿nancial crisis makes this apparent. We believe the papers in
this volume constitute another step in building the foundations for future research.
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